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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
WALTER P. HENOCH, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
W. H. BINTZ COMPANY, A Corpor-
ation, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 
7578 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, respondent herein, accepts the statement 
of facts contained in the brief of appellant. 
The parties hereto will be designated herein as they 
were in the lower court. The respondent herein will be re-
ferred to as the plaintiff, and the appellant will be referred 
to as the defendant. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS UNCONTRADICTED THAT 
VOLUNTARY GIFT OF $100.00 BY THE DEFENDANT 
TO T'HE PLAINT'IFF CHRISTMAS OF 1947, WHICH 
WAS PRIOR TO THE DATE DEFENDANT WAS RE-
QUIRED UNDER CONTRA:CT T'O PAY PLAINTIFF A 
BONUS, WAS GIVEN TO PLAINTIFF WITHOUT ARE-
QUEST BY THE PLAINTIFF FOR AN ADVANOE!MENT 
OF HIS BONUS, AND SO CAN NOT BE CONSIDERED 
A PAYMENT ON T'HE CONTRACT, BUT ONLY A GIFT. 
POINT II. 
THE PROMISE TO PUT PLAINTIFF ON THE IN-
CENTIVE BONUS PLAN, "THE SAME AS THE OTHER 
SALESMEN," BEGINNING AS OF MARCH 1,1948, WAS 
DEFINITE AND CERTAIN, WHERE THE BONUS WAS 
NOT PAYABLE UNTIL MARCH 1, 1949, AND THE 
OTHER SALESMEN, AS WELL AS THE PLAINTIFF, 
WERE INFORMED, PRIOR TO THAT DATE, THAT 
THEY WOULD ALL BE ON THE SAME INCENTIVE 
BONUS PLAN BEGINNING MARCH 1, 1948, AND THEY 
WERE ACTUALLY PLACED ON SUCH A BONUS PLAN, 
AND BEFORE THAT DATE PLAINTIFF WAS IN-
FORMED THAT HE WAS ON A BONUS. BASIS OF 1 
PER CENT' ON TOTAL SALES IF HE SOLD A QUOTA 
OF $100,000.00, WHICH HE DID SELL. 
1 
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POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO A BONUS OF 1 
PER CENT ON THE TOTAL SALES OF $197,553.00, 
OF WHICH HE RECEIVED ONLY $1,000.00. 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT HELD SORENSEN OUT AS HAV-
ING AUTHORITY TO HIRE AND FIX PAY AND BY 
THEIR FAILURE TO TIMELY INFORM PLAINTIFF 
THAT SORENSEN DID NOT HAVE SUCH AUTHOR-
ITY, DEFENDANT IS ESTOPPED TO THEREAFTER 
DENY SORENSEN'S AUTHORITY. 
POINT V. 
T'HE DEFENDANT IS ESTOPPED TO DENY 
PLAINTIFF A BONUS ON THE STAR VALLEY 
CHEESE TRANSACTIONS INVOL,VED IN POINT V 
FOR THE REASON THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO 
INFORM PLAINTIFF AT THE TIME OF HIS HIRING 
OR WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME THEREAFTER 
THAT SUCH SALES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM 
BONUS COMPUTATIONS FOR PLAINTIFF OR FOR 
THE OTHER DAIRY SALESMEN. 
POINT VI. 
EVIDENCE IS UNDISPUTED THAT PLAINTIFF 
GAVB UP A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION FOR THE 
DEFENDANT'S PROMISE OF A 1 PER CENT BONUS 
AND WAS DISCHARGED BY DEFENDANT WITHOUT 
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4 
CAUSE, BEFORE THE END OF THE 1949-1950 FISCAL 
YEAR, AND SINCE PLAINTIFF GAVE A VALUABLE 
CONSIDERATION FOR SAID PROMISE, PLAINTIFF 
IS ENTITLED TO HIS BONUS ON ALL SALES FOR 
THE SAID PERIOD TO THE DATE OF HIS DIS-
CHARGE, AS DEFENDANT, BY DISCHARGING 
PLAINTIFF, MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR PLAINTIFF 
TO COMPLETE THE YEAR, OR COMPLETE HIS 
QUOTA. 
POINT VII. 
THERE WAS NO EVIDE'NCE OF A TENDER OR 
SETTLE-MENT' IN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BY 
THE DEFENDANT TO THE PLAINTIFF AND 
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A DEFINITE AND 
CERTAIN TENDER IN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
IS A QUEST'ION OF FACT FOR THE JURY, AND 
WHEN THE JURY DETERMINED FROM THE EVI-
DENCE THAT THERE WAS NOT AN ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION, THE TRIAL COURT AND THE AP-
PELLATE COURT ARE BOUND THER.EBY. 
POINT VIII. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE 
DE'FENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR NON SUIT, FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT, FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITH-
STANDING, AND FOR NEW TRIAL, AS ALL OF THE 
POINTS. ON WHICH DEFENDANT RELIED WER.E 
QUESTIONS OF FACT AND THERE WAS SUF-
FICIENT EVIDENCE ON EACH POINT TO SUPPORT 
TH'E JURY'S VERDICT. 
,Jl 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS UNCONTRADICTED THAT 
VOLUNTARY GIFT OF $100.00 BY THE DEFENDANT 
TO THE PLAINTIFF CHRISTMAS OF 1947, WHICH 
WAS PRIOR TO THE DATE DEFENDANT WAS RE-
QUIRED UNDER CONTRACT TO PAY PLAINTIFF A 
BONUS, WAS GIVEN TO PLAINTIFF WITHOUT A 
REQUEST BY THE PLAINTIFF FOR AN ADVANCE-
MENT OF HIS BONUS, AND SO CAN NOT BE CON-
SIDERED A PAYMENT ON THE CONTRACT, BUT 
ONLY A GIFT. 
There is only one question involved in defendant's first 
point: Was the Christmas present of $100.00 given to plain-
tiff December 25, 1947, by the defendant, a gratuity, or 
was it a part of the contract to pay plaintiff the promised 
$500.00 incentive bonus at the end of the fiscal year March 
1, 1948? The jury must have decided that the Christmas 
present was a pure gratuity and not a partial satisfaction 
of the contract to pay $500.00. 
By the contract of hiring, the defendant was obligated 
to pay the plaintiff $500.00 on or about the 1st of March, 
1948, the end of the 1947-1948 fiscal year. Any sum which 
the defendant voluntarily gave to the plaintiff prior to the 
end of the said fiscal year, without a request from the 
plaintiff, (and there was no evidence of a request for an 
advancement by the plaintiff) would be purely a gift, not 
chargeable against the contractual obligation to pay $500.00. 
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That this was the intent of the parties is shown from the acts 
of the defendant. When De Vine was questioned as to why ·if 
$400.00 was paid instead of $500.00, he did not say that 
plaintiff had received $500.00-$100.00 at Christmas and 
$400.00 then. He merely attempted to deny Sorensen's 
authority to promise $500.00 (R. 98). Again the following 
year, according to De Vine's statement, $1,000.00 was prom-
ised (which plaintiff claims should have been 1% of all 
sales). $100.00 was paid at Christmas time and $1,000.00 at 
the end of the fiscal year. They did not pay $100.00 at 
Christmas and $900.00 at the end of the fiscal year. The 
defendant thus, by its own acts, placed its own interpreta-
tion upon the Christmas gratuity and showed that it was 
not intended to apply against the contractual bonus obliga-
tion (R. 101, L. 13-15). 
POINT II. 
THE PROMISE TO PUT PLAINTIFF ON THE IN-
CENTIVE BONUS PLAN, "THE SAME AS THE OTHER 
SALESMEN," BEGINNING AS OF MARCH 1, 1948, 
WAS DEFINITE AND CERTAIN, WHERE THE BONUS 
WAS NOT PAYABLE UNTIL MARCH 1, 1949, AND THE 
OTHER SALESMEN, AS WELL AS THE PLAINTIFF, 
WERE INFORMED, PRIOR TO THAT DATE, THAT 
THEY WOULD ALL BE ON THE SAME INCENTIVE 
BONUS PLAN BEGINNING MARCH 1, 1948, AND 
THEY WERE ACTUALLY PLACED ON SUCH A BONUS 
PLAN, AND BEFORE THAT DATE PLAINTIFF WAS 
INFORMED THAT HE WAS ON A BONUS BASIS OF 
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1 PER CENT ON TOTAL SALES IF HE SOLD A QUOTA 
OF $100,000.00, WHICH HE DID SELL. 
The contention of defendant in Point II, that the 
"methods or factors upon which incentive pay was to be 
computed" were too uncertain and indefinite upon which 
to base a contract to pay plaintiff a bonus during the fiscal 
year of 1948-1949, is certainly unfounded from the evi-
dence. There was an incentive plan with a definite bonus 
based on a sales quota, under which the plaintiff then be-
came entitled to a bonus of a specific sum. 
At the time of the original hiring, plaintiff was prom-
ised by defendant's agent, Sorensen, that he would receive 
the· incentive plan "the same as the other fellows in the 
dairy department" (R. 24, 48, 63). Sorensen, on cross-
examination, was asked the question, "I think you testified, 
didn't you, that Mr. Henoch would be treated like the rest 
of the salesmen in the discussion with regard to bonuses?" 
To which he answered, "That's right, Mr. Richards" (R. 
86, L. 14-17). Sorensen also testified that the incentive 
plan, as applicable to other salesmen, was explained to 
Henoch (R. 79, L. 4-5). Sorensen was asked, "But you said 
he would be treated like the rest of the salesmen," to which 
he answered, "If he earned it, yes." He was then asked, 
"And when you told him if he earned that, you meant if he 
sold his quota?" and he answered, "Yes, but the quota was 
part of the incentive plan. I couldn't tell him what the 
quota would be" (R. 79, L. 9-15). 
When the bonus basis and quota were established for 
the other salesmen, and, as plaintiff contends, likewise estab-
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lished for plaintiff, it thereupon became binding upon the 
defendant and could not be arbitrarily withdrawn or 
amended by the defendant. 56 C. J. S. 529, n. 95. 
The defendant makes a point of the fact that the other 
fellows who were selling in the dairy department were at 
that time, on different incentive pay programs. These 
divergent incentive programs only carried them up to the 
end of the fiscal year of 1947-1948, at which time another 
incentive program was being discussed by the defendant 
which was to, and which did, go into effect as of March 1st 
1948. To cover the 1947-1948 period, when there was diver-
gence between the bonus plans as set up for the other em-
ployees, plaintiff was promised a flat $500.00 bonus. From 
and after March 1st, 1948, all of the salesmen in the dairy 
department, of the defendant company, were on the same 
incentive plan (R. 107, L. 27-30; R. 108, L. 1-5). The plain-
tiff was informed by Sorensen in the fall of 1948 that he 
was on the incentive plan the same as the other salesmen 
and that if he sold $100,000.00, he would receive 1 ro upon 
total sales in his territory, whether or not he himself, or the 
defendant company, made the sale (R. 63 and 64). 
Note the conflict in the testimony of Sorensen and De-
Vine, defendant's witnesses, with regard to the date the 
incentive bonus plan was born. De Vine said the plan was 
not born until January of 1949 and that Kilgore and Cole 
were notified January 7, 1949, that the new plan would 
take effect and be retroactive to March 1, 1948 (R. 108, L. 
14-17); but Sorensen said that he had learned of the plan in 
the "fall of 1948" from discussions with DeVine (R. 73, L. 
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6-9). It is only reasonable to suppose that if Sorensen 
learned of the plan in the fall of 1948, that Sorensen did 
promise plaintiff the same bonus that the other fellows in 
the dairy department were receiving during the same time. 
It was reasonable, too, for plaintiff to write to DeVine in 
the fall of 1948, after Sorensen had explained the new 
bonus plan, and ask for an official confirmation of Soren-
sen's promise. This refers to the letter which the defendant 
presents as an argument to show indefiniteness and un-
certainty of the terms of the contract. The plaintiff knew 
by all the promises obtained from the defendant that his 
bonus would be the same as the other dairy salesmen would 
receive and he wanted official confirmation of the fact as 
it had been then determined. Plaintiff was also in the dark 
about the application of sales made by others in his territory 
which had been promised to him. 
The jury had to choose between the direct testimony of 
the plaintiff and the conflicting testimony of the defend-
ant's witnesses. The defendant, by its witnesses, tried to 
show that there was no quota and no promise of a 1% 
bonus based upon that quota, but again the acts of the com-
pany and the attitudes of the parties support the testimony 
of the plaintiff and controvert the verbal, conflicting testi-
mony of the witnesses for the defendant. The plaintiff 
testified that his sales quota was $100,000.00 (R. 30, L. 
30-31; R. 31, L. 1; R. 34, L. 7-19, 26-30; R. 42, L. 17-24; 
R. 44, L. 12-13, 20-29 ; R. 53, L. 13-14 ; R. 63, L. 22-30 ; R. 
64, L. 1; R. 66, L. 1-11). 
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Now note the acts and indirect, off-guard statements of 
the witnesses for the defendant, which bring out the truth in 
support of plaintiff's direct testimony as follows: 
(a) Other salesmen were getting a bonus of 1% based 
upon a $100,000.00 quota (Sorensen, R. 82; DeVine, R. 107, 
L. 27-30; R. 108, L. 1-5). 
(b) Plaintiff was to be treated like other salesmen 
(R. 86, L. 14-17; R. 79, L. 9-11). 
(c) Plaintiff was better trained than the other sales-
men and was left in charge in Sorensen's absence (R. 81). 
(d) An incentive plan was explained to plaintiff (R. 
79, L. 4-5) and the quota was an integral part of that in-
centive plan (R. 79, L. 14~17; R. 85, L. 10 and 11). 
(e) Sales quotas were established for plaintiff and 
other salesmen (R. 72 and 74). 
(f) Plaintiff's territory was enlarged at his request 
in order that he might more readily attain his quota (R. 
48, L. 27-30). 
(g) The defendant voluntarily agreed to pay the 
plaintiff $1,000.00 to keep him encouraged (R. 99, L. 12) 
and half-way satisfied (R. 103, L. 17-22) at a time when 
DeVine did not think plaintiff would attain his quota (R. 
34, L. 7-17). 
(h) The promise was confirmed by payment of the 
$1000.00. 
(i) The reaction of DeVine when informed plaintiff 
expected to attain his quota confirmed instead of refuting 
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the quota, and the bonus based thereon, when DeVine said, 
"Well, it will only go over a few dollars anyway. It is only 
a matter of $40 or $50" (R. 34, L. 7-19). 
Each of these points supports plaintiff's testimony. 
Considered together, they constitute irrefutable proof that 
the quota was established on which the promised bonus 
was based for plaintiff, as well as for the other salesmen. 
"Absolute certainty in every deal is not required 
as basis for an action at law. When only legal relief 
is sought, only 'reasonable certainty' is demanded of 
contract, requirement being fulfilled if meaning of 
contract, as whole, is intelligible to court." Kann v. 
Wausau Abrasiyes Co., 153 A. 823, 85 N. H. 41; 
Cowles v. Cole, 244 N. Y. S. 4, 137 Misc. 491; 17 C. 
J. S. 366, Note 79 (2). 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO A BONUS OF 1 
PER CENT ON THE TOTAL SALES OF $197,553.00, 
OF WHICH HE RECEIVED ONLY $1,000.00. 
The contention of defendant, that plaintiff received 
more than was due him, is not sound. The plaintiff con-
tends that defendant sold in plaintiff's territory, during 
the fiscal year commencing March 1, 1948, to February 28, 
1949, dairy equipment in the sum of $197,553.00, based 
upon which the bonus should have been $1,975.53, of which 
plaintiff received only $1,000.00. 
Defendant admitted that the sales made by defendant 
during the year ending February 28, 1949, in plaintiff's 
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territory was $105,860.00. Bonus on this amount would be 
$1,058.60. Defendant contends $100.00 was paid at Christ-
mas 1948 and $1,000.00 in March 1949, thus overpaying 
the bonus by $41.40. The argument set forth under Point 1 
with reference to the Christmas gratuity in 1947, applies 
with equal force to the Christmas gratuity paid at Christ-
mas in 1948. 
Plaintiff contends that in addition to the $105,860.00, 
two additional items (the amounts of which and the profits 
made thereon by defendant were undisputed), one for $49,-
270.80 and the other for $42,422.00, were actually sales by 
the defendant in plaintiff's territory and which, added to 
the $105,860.00, made up the total of $197,553.00. Defend-
ant contends that these two latter items were not sales by 
the defendant. The plaintiff concedes that these two items 
were not sales of dairy equipment from the floor of the 
defendant company, but were sales by the defendant com-
pany as brokers or agents for the manufacturer. It is undis-
puted that the defendant company did receive from these 
two sales, profits of $2,463.54 and $2,121.00, respectively, 
during the fiscal year ending February 28, 1949 (R. 88, L. 
18-20). From the conflicting testimony, the jury believed 
these two transactions to constitute sales by the defendant 
upon which bonus was due to the plaintiff. 
Let us summarize the evidence on which the jury based 
their findings. The plaintiff testified (R. 31) that Soren-
sen made a trip to Star Valley and was instrumental in 
selling the boilers. They were handled by or through Pace 
Turpin Company. This sale was in plaintiff's territory 
(R. 31, L. 22-23). The dryer was also sold through the in-
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strumentality of Mr. Sorensen (R. 32, L. 8-12; R. 55, L. 
22-26). Plaintiff's cross-examination shows that the sales 
were made by W. H. Bintz Company (R. 56, L. 1-3; R. 57, 
L. 2-6). Plaintiff, who was an engineer, took measurements 
for installation of the boilers and assisted in the installation 
(R. 54, L. 10-24). Both commissions were received during 
the summer of 1948 (R. 77 and 78 and R. 88). 
The jury rightfully disregarded the nomenclature of 
the defendants when they stated these transactions were not 
"sales" and concluded that they were actually sales by the 
defendant, on which defendant received a brokerage or com-
mission, of which plaintiff was entitled to his bonus percent-
age. 
Furthermore, if such sales were not to be included in 
the basis of the compensation of defendant's dairy depart-
ment salesmen, the defendant was under a duty to inform 
plaintiff before the obligation arose and not after the 
transaction had been fully consummated and after plaintiff 
had rendered service in connection with the transactions and 
after he had been promised that ALL sales made in his 
territory would be taken into account in computing the 
bonus. This profit, commission, or brokerage, or whatever 
defendant chose to call it, was received by defendant in the 
summer of 1948 (R. 88, L. 17) but it was not until Novem-
ber of that same year that plaintiff was informed that it 
was not the intention of the defendant to pay commission on 
items of this nature (R. 100, L. 15-28; R. 34). The defend-
ant denied (R. 74 and R. 94) that these transactions were 
sales, but since defendant received $2,463.54 on the boilers 
and $2,121.00 on the dryer, the jury was justified in de-
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termining that these two items were sales by defendant, and 
plaintiff was therefore entitled to 1% on such sales. 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT HELD SORENSEN OUT AS HAV-
ING AUTHORITY TO HIRE AND FIX PAY AND BY 
THEIR FAILURE TO TIMELY INFORM PLAINTIFF 
THAT SORENSEN DID NOT HAVE SUCH AUTHOR-
ITY, DEFENDANT IS ESTOPPED TO THEREAFTER 
DENY SORENSEN'S AUTHORITY. 
The defendant, by this point, seeks to deny liability by 
attempting to deny Sorensen's authority to employ and fix 
incentive pay. 
At the time of the employment, the defendant held 
Sorensen out as having authority, both to hire and fix pay. 
That he had authority to hire is affirmed by DeVine's testi-
mony (R. 107). If Sorensen had the power to hire, as testi-
fied to by De Vine, he certainly had the apparent authority 
to fix rates of compensation, and De Vine, by his acts, con-
firmed and acknowledged Sorensen's authority to hire and 
to fix rates of pay, as shown by his acts at the time of the 
hiring. 
At the time of the original employment, plaintiff had 
an offer of another job which would have paid him more 
money. He therefore insisted that Sorensen tell him defin-
itely what his compensation would be with the defendant 
( R. 23) . At that time the defendant held Sorensen out as 
having authority to hire and to fix pay; and Sorensen did 
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fix the monthly salary, the expense account, and the incentive 
bonus, (Henoch, R. 23; Sorensen, R. 69, L. 24-27). When 
the act of hiring was completed, Sorensen then took plain-
tiff upstairs to meet Mr. DeVine. Regarding this conver-
sation, DeVine testified (R. 96 and 97), "Mr. Sorensen 
brought him in and introduced him to me and said he was 
employing him and (it) was just more or less of a welcome 
to the organization." At this conversation nothing was said 
by De Vine or Sorensen respecting compensation. On the 
other hand, the company confirmed Sorensen's hiring and 
establishment of compensation by paying regularly the 
agreed salary and expenses. Not until eight months after 
the hiring, in March of 1948, was Sorensen's authority first 
called into question. If Sorensen actually had no authority, 
then Mr. DeVine had a duty at the time plaintiff was hired 
to inform plaintiff what his compensation would be. He 
could not wait for eight months and then, for the first time, 
deny Sorensen's authority. 
Nothing more was said about Sorensen's authority until 
November of 1948, which was sixteen months after the time 
of hiring, but again De Vine's actions conflict with his spoken 
word because his actions in offering the $1,000.00 bonus, 
even though he thought plaintiff was not going to attain 
the $100,000.00 quota, indicates that he knew all about the 
incentive program which Sorensen had promised and that 
he was ratifying Sorensen's authority and promise (R. 34). 
The direct testimony of the plaintiff, together with the 
omission of the defendant and the subsequent acts of the de-
fendant, justified the jury in finding that Sorensen had not 
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only apparent but actual authority to hire and to fix com-
pensation. 
POINT V. 
THE DEFENDANT IS ESTOPPED TO DENY 
PLAINTIFF A BONUS ON THE STAR VALLEY 
CHEESE TRANSACTIONS INVOLVED IN POINT V 
FOR THE REASON THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO 
INFORM PLAINTIFF AT THE TIME OF HIS HIRING 
OR WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME THEREAFTER 
THAT SUCH SALES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM 
BONUS COMPUTATIONS FOR PLAINTIFF OR FOR 
THE OTHER DAIRY SALESMEN. 
With reference to Point V, we need merely to state 
that the plaintiff, at the time he was hired, was informed 
that he would receive a bonus, based upon all sales in his 
territory, by the defendant company, and there was no 
reservation of any deals wherein the defendant company 
sold, as agent or broker, for the manufacturer. Plaintiff 
was not informed that items of this nature were not to be 
included until sixteen months after he was hired, and after 
the company had received $4,584.54 profit from the two 
transactions in question. This matter is fully argued under 
Point III above. 
The defendant is estopped by its failure to inform the 
plaintiff, at the time of hiring, of the reservation of any 
sales on which the plaintiff, or the other salesman, would 
not be entitled to bonus. 
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POINT VI. 
EVIDENCE IS UNDISPUTED THAT PLAINTIFF 
GAVE UP A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION FOR THE 
DEFENDANT'S PROl\1ISE OF A 1 PER CENT BONUS 
AND WAS DISCHARGED BY DEFENDANT WITHOUT 
CAUSE, BEFORE THE END OF THE 1949-1950 FISCAL 
YEAR, AND SINCE PLAINTIFF GAVE A VALUABLE 
CONSIDERATION FOR SAID PROMISE, PLAINTIFF 
IS ENTITLED TO HIS BONUS ON ALL SALES FOR 
THE SAID PERIOD TO THE DATE OF HIS DIS-
CHARGE, AS DEFENDANT, BY DISCHARGING 
PLAINTIFF, MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR PLAINTIFF 
TO COMPLETE THE YEAR, OR COMPLETE HIS 
QUOTA. 
The question here raised is the right of the plaintiff to 
receive his 1% on sales by the defendant in plaintiff's ter-
ritory during the 1949 fiscal year and up to the date of 
plaintiff's discharge. 
The plaintiff was discharged by the defendant on De-
cember 15,1949 (Answer to Interrogatory 10 (b) R. 6). 
On page 101 of the Record, line 19, appear the words, "Not 
up to the time that he severed his employment with us." 
It is the sincere contention of the plaintiff and of the plain-
tiff's counsel that the witness DeVine stated this answer, 
"Not up to the time that we severed his employment with 
us," which statement would be in accordance with the actual 
fact ; and motion to correct the record in this regard is 
being concurrently filed, with the filing of this brief. 
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There is nothing in the record to show that the de-
fendant was discharged for cause, either in the pleadings 
or in the proof. If defendant elected to rely upon this as 
an affirmative defense it should have been pleaded and 
proved at the trial. 
The obligation to pay a bonus is contractual, and in this 
case was based upon a valid and valuable consideration, to-
wit: the giving up of a better-paying job (R. 24, L. 7-8). 
"Bonus at end of year. A promise to pay an 
employee a bonus at the end of the year is a mere 
gratuity and not enforceable where the employee is 
not shown to have done or foregone something which 
otherwise he was not obliged to do or forego; but if 
the employee is induced thereby to do something 
which he is not under legal obligation to do, or to 
forego something which he does not have to forego, 
the promise is enforceable." 56 C. J. S. 529. 
As authority, C. J. S. quotes Redd v. Williams Radiator 
· Co., 296 P. 676, 678, 112 Cal. App. 353 and cases cited in 
39 C. J. 159, Note 96. 
The following cases support the rule of law that where 
an employee has given up a good and valuable consideration 
for a promise of a bonus at the end of the year, he is en-
titled to a proportionate share of the bonus where he is dis-
charged without cause, prior to the end of the year, and the 
burden of proof rests upon the defendant employer, if it 
sets up the discharge as a defense, to prove that the dis-
charge was for valid cause: 
Willoughby Camera Stores vs. Commr. Int. Rev., 
C. C. A. 2, 125 F. 2nd 607 
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Roberts, et ux v. Mills, Inc., 114 S. E. 530, 28 
A. L. R. 338 
Payne v. United States, 269 Fed. 871, 50 App. 
D. C. 219 
Youngberg v. Lamberton, 91 Minn. 100, 97 N. 
w. 571 
Mile v. California Growers, etc., 114 P. (2d) 651 
In accordance with the provisions of the law as. above 
quoted, and in the absence of any showing of discharge 
for cause, the jury was justified in awarding plaintiff a 
bonus, for the proportionate part of the year, based upon 
the $62,453.18 sales which he had made up to the time of 
his discharge in his territory (R. 24, L. 7-8). 
POINT VII. 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF A TENDER OR 
SETTLEMENT IN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BY 
THE DEFENDANT TO THE PLAINTIFF AND 
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A DEFINITE AND 
CERTAIN TENDER IN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
IS A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY, AND 
WHEN THE JURY DETERMINED FROM THE EVI-
DENCE THAT THERE WAS NOT AN ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION, THE TRIAL COURT AND THE AP-
PELATE COURT ARE BOUND THEREBY. 
This point considers whether or not there has been an 
accord and satisfaction at the end of each pay period. 
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Whether or not the plaintiff accepted these checks 
from the defendant in full satisfaction of the plaintiff's 
claim, and whether or not an accord and satisfaction existed, 
is a question for the jury, and if there is any evidence upon 
which to base their verdict the trial court, as well as the 
appellant court, is bound thereby. This is the law as set 
forth in the only case which defendant has cited in its brief, 
as authority for its. position, to-wit: Ashton vs. Skeen, 85 
Utah 489, at 489-499,39 Pac. 2nd, last PP pg 1077, where the 
court said: 
"In the present case the court has found and the 
finding was amply justified by the evidence and this 
court is bound by that finding, that Ford Brothers 
refused to accept it in full settlement of their claim, 
and notified Skeen that they wanted more money." 
The case of Shell v. McCrum, 179 Iowa 1232, 162 N. 
W. 759, held that accord and satisfaction and settlement in-
volved an aspect of the essentials of a contract, and of the 
law of estoppel. The Court said : 
"In other words there is no settlement and no 
accord and satisfaction unless both parties act know-
ingly, with intent to execute the accord * * * 
It suffices where stated, that upon the record and on 
authority it was at least a question for the jury 
whether the claimed accord, satisfaction and settle-
ment were executed. Since that was a jury question, 
the court did not err in refusing to hold that the 
accord was established as a matter of law." 
The jury had the evidence of the checks and the evi-
dence of the acts of the parties. All the checks, the Christ-
mas gratuities, the monthly salary and expense checks, and 
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the bonus checks, all bore the same statement, "Your en-
dorsement of the attached check is an acknowledgment of 
its correctness. This is an exact copy of our payroll record. 
W. H. Bintz Company. Payroll Receipt." 
If these words were intended as an offer in accord and 
satisfaction, such offer, at best, was ambiguous and could 
be interpreted by the recipient and by the jury as a partial 
payment on account, especially in view of the defendant's 
evidence that there was no "payroll record" of a promised 
incentive bonus (R. 101, L. 9-10). If there was no payroll 
record of a bonus, any statement on the check with refer-
ence thereto could have no probative value. Then the only 
thing left on the check is the acknowledgment of its "cor-
rectness." Correct may mean anything. It could be "cor-
rect" as a payment on account. It did not purport to be 
payment in full, or settlement in full, as is required for an 
accord and satisfaction. 
On the question of ambiguity of the terms employed in 
the offer of an accord and satisfaction, the court, in the 
case of Crucible Steel Co. of America v. Premier Mfg. Co., 
94 Conn. 652, 110 Atl. 52, said: 
"When the assent of the creditor is sought to be 
inferred from the acceptance of a lesser sum than 
that claimed to be due, the fact that such amount is 
offered in full discharge of the whole claim must 
have been communicated to the creditor in some 
unmistakable manner.'' 
The law is well stated to be: 
"To constitute such a payment an accord and 
satisfaction, it must be offered as FULL SATIS-
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FACTION of a claim and acknowledgment by sueh 
declaration or under such circumstances as would 
amount to a condition that if accepted by the creditor 
it would be in full satisfaction of the debt." Harrison 
v. Henderson, 67 Kans. 194, 62 L. R. A. 760, 100 Am. 
St. Rep. 386, 72 P. 875; 34 A. L. R. 1052. 1 C. J.p. 
558. Notes 62, and p. 559. Notes 69 and 70." 
As each monthly check was given to the plaintiff, cer-
tainly such checks were not considered by either plaintiff 
or defendant to constitute a settlement of the promised 
bonus, which promise the defendant acknowledged by its 
acts, as hereinabove argued. When the $400.00 check was 
given, there was absolutely no statement, prior thereto, 
that it was intended as an accord and satisfaction, nor was 
plaintiff informed by defendant that defendant considered 
the check payment in full. When plaintiff received the 
$400.00 check, he went to Sorensen, who had promised him 
$500.00, and complained about the amount of the check 
and Sorensen said, "They probably deducted the $100.00 
Christmas present from it" ( R. 26). Sorensen did not say 
the balance would not be paid or that the $400.00 was all 
he would get. Plaintiff, after receiving said check, went 
to DeVine, the defendant's manager, and complained about 
having received only $400.00 instead of $500.00, and De Vine 
did not say that the $400.00 was all he would get, but said, 
"Well, we have been trying to find out for two weeks what 
Bob had promised you" (R. 41, L. 10-20). And when plain-
tiff demanded the balance, De Vine did not answer one 
way or another. He certainly did not inform the plaintiff 
that he would not get the balance of $100.00 owing plain-
~: 
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tiff, and De Vine, on direct examination, did not assert 
that it was payment in full (R. 98, L. 1-18). 
At the time the $1,000.00 was paid, the last words prior 
thereto were to the effect that DeVine did not expect the 
bonus check would amount to more than $40.00 or $50.00 
in excess of the $1,000.00 (R. 34, L. 16-17). When plain-
tiff received this $1,000.00 check, he protested that it was 
insufficient, and still expected to receive more (R. 35, L. 
19-23). 
The jury must have believed (a) that since the monthly 
checks all contained the same statement, but the defendant 
nevertheless paid Christmas gratuity and bonus, the de-
fendant itself did not rely upon the statement on the checks 
as constituting a tender of an accord and satisfaction; or 
(b) that the wording on the checks is so vague and uncer-
tain and ambiguous that it did not constitute an accord and 
satisfaction; or (c) that the plaintiff was not at any time 
informed that the payments tendered to him were intended 
to be tendered as an accord and satisfaction, the checks not 
to be used unless the payee was willing to accept them as 
payment in full. In any event the jury must have found that 
no accord and satisfaction existed, and the trial court and 
appellate court are both bound by such finding. 
POINT VIII. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR NON SUIT, FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT, FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITH-
STANDING, AND FOR NEW TRIAL, AS ALL OF THE 
POINTS ON WHICH DEFENDANT RELIED WERE 
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QUESTIONS OF FACT AND THERE WAS SUF-
FICIENT EVIDENCE ON EACH POINT TO SUPPORT 
THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
It is apparent that Point VIII raises only the question 
of whether there was sufficient evidence upon which the 
jury could find, on all of the issues, for the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff has heretofore, in this brief, set forth a resume 
of the evidence as to each of the items (a) to (e) contained 
in defendant's Point VIII justifying the jury in finding 
for the plaintiff. It is not deemed necessary nor proper 
to repeat the argument here. Therefrom, it is clear that 
the jury had sufficient evidence before it to determine all 
of these questions of fact raised by the defendant in Point 
VIII and decided all of them in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant, and the court did not err in denying 
the defendant's motion for non-suit, for directed verdict, 
for judgment notwithstanding, and for new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, plaintiff submits that the verdict of the 
jury is supported by sufficient evidence in every particular 
and that the judgment of the trial court should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN Y. RICHARDS, 
PERRIS S. JENSEN, 
406 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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